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Discretionary Sentencing in Military 
Commissions:  Why and How the Sentencing 
Guidelines in the Military Commissions Act 
Should be Changed* 
Brian Wolensky** 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2001, during the early days of the “War on Terror,” United 
States officials captured Salim Ahmed Hamdan, the personal 
driver and bodyguard of Osama Bin Laden, while he was 
transporting weapons across the Afghani border.1  From 2002 
until his trial in 2008, Hamdan was classified as an enemy 
combatant2 pursuant to the Geneva Convention3 and detained at 
 
* This article was initially written and published when the state of military 
commissions were in flux.  It reflects the events regarding military commissions up to and 
through April 2009.  However, an important decision was made by President Obama in 
May of 2009.  See William Glaberson, Obama Considers Allowing Please by 9/11 
Suspects, N. Y. TIMES, June 6, 2009, at A1, A12.  Obama decided to continue the use of 
military commissions under a new set of rules which provide more protections for 
detainees.  Id.  Due to the timing of publication, this decision is not incorporated in this 
article.  Although Obama has decided to continue the military commissions, he has not 
finalized a set of rules.  Id.  This article serves as a recommendation for changes to the 
rules of the Military Commissions Act, which Congress and the Obama Administration 
should consider. 
** J.D. candidate 2010, Chapman University School of Law.  I would like to thank 
Professor Kyndra Rotunda for all of her guidance, feedback, and expertise.  I would also 
like to thank the outgoing and incoming Chapman Law Review boards for their excellent 
work and careful review.  Finally, I would like to extend a special thank you to my family 
and friends for without all of their love, support, guidance, and patience this note would 
not have been possible. 
 1 Although Hamdan was considered a low level player in Al Qaeda, he was fairly 
involved with the group.  See Charge Sheet of Salim Ahmed Hamdan, United States v. 
Hamdan (Feb. 2, 2008), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/d2007Hamdan%20-
%20Notification%20of%20Sworn%20Charges.pdf. 
 2 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).  “Citizens who associate themselves 
with the military arm of the enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and direction 
enter this country bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents within the meaning of the 
Hague Convention and the law of war.”  Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1942).  The 
definition of enemy combatants, as described in Ex parte Quirin, was reaffirmed by the 
Supreme Court in 2004.  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004).  This classification 
is important because an enemy combatant can be detained until the end of a current 
conflict, and is subject to trial by military commission.  Id. at 521.  Further, the United 
States has classified members of the Taliban, al Qaeda, and associated forces as unlawful 
enemy combatants, and defines an unlawful enemy combatant as “a person who has 
WOLENSKY 10/15/2009 6:43 PM 
722 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 12:721 
Guantanamo Bay.  On August 7, 2008, Hamdan was the first 
Guantanamo detainee convicted by a United States Military 
Commission—governed by the Military Commissions Act of 2006 
(MCA)—for providing material support for terrorism.4  Hamdan 
was sentenced to five and a half years in prison.  However, the 
military commission judge granted “administrative credit”5 for 
time served since Hamdan’s capture in 2001.6 As a result, 
Hamdan only had to serve five additional months. 
Hamdan’s case, the first application of the MCA,7 showed 
weaknesses in the current military commission system, 
particularly with regard to sentencing.8  These weaknesses must 
be fixed to ensure that detainees will be given a fair trial as 
commissions go forward.9  In the words of Thomas Paine, “[h]e 
that would make his own liberty secure must guard even his 
enemy from oppression; for if he violates this duty he establishes 
a precedent that will reach to himself.”10 
 
engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially supported hostilities 
against the United States or its co-belligerents.”  10 U.S.C. § 948a (Supp. 2008). 
 3 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
 4 See William Glaberson, Panel Sentences Bin Laden Driver to a Short Term, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 8, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/08/washington/ 
08gitmo.html?partner=rssnyt.  Although Hamdan was the first case to be completed by a 
military commission, in 2007 David Hicks, an Australian detainee, entered a guilty plea 
and was given a nine month sentence and thus became the first detainee to be released 
via the MCA.  David McFadden, Gitmo Jury: Life Sentence for Bin Laden Videomaker, 
ABC NEWS, Nov. 3, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=6169091 (last visited Mar. 8, 
2008). 
 5  An administrative credit is the reduction of a sentence by allowing time held to 
count forward.  After administrative credit was granted to Hamdan, the Government 
challenged the commission’s authority to grant such credit.  See Corrected Government 
Motion for Reconsideration, United States v. Hamdan (Sep. 24, 2008), available at 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/us-motion-re-hamdan-
sentence-9-24-08.pdf. 
 6 Jerry Markon & Josh White, Bin Laden Driver Gets 5 1/2 Years; U.S. Sought 30, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 2008, at A1. 
 7 Although Hamdan was the first case to be completed by a military commission, on 
November 4, 2008, Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul was sentenced to life in prison.  
McFadden, supra note 4.  Al Bahlul is seen as an extremist who has publicly expressed 
interest in destroying the United States.  See Charge Sheet of Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman 
al Bahlul, United States v. al Bahlul, (Feb. 8, 2008) [hereinafter Charge Sheet of al 
Bahlul], available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2008/d20080208bahlul.pdf.  It 
is interesting to note that the decision did not appear in many newspapers and hardly 
received national coverage.  This could be due to the fact that many people believe al 
Bahlul belongs in jail for life.  However, it is most likely due to the fact that the decision 
was handed down the day before the 2008 Presidential Election. 
 8 One obvious problem that surfaced is whether administrative credit can be 
granted.  See Corrected Government Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 5 (“The 
accused is not entitled to administrative credit because nothing in law or regulation 
authorizes such credit.”). 
 9 See McFadden, supra note 4. 
 10 THOMAS PAINE, DISSERTATION ON FIRST PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT (1795), 
reprinted in THE THOMAS PAINE READER 452, 470 (1987). 
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Amid the growing criticism of the use of military 
commissions,11  President Barack Obama issued an Executive 
Order shutting down Guantanamo Bay and suspending the use 
of the commissions until their procedures are reviewed and a 
course of action planned.12  While shutting down Guantanamo 
may be viewed as a publicity move,13 abandoning military 
commissions and the MCA would be a catastrophic move that 
could have devastating effects.  The MCA is by no means 
perfect—in fact, as discussed throughout, its sentencing 
guidelines, among other things, must be changed—however, 
abandoning the MCA at this point would take the United States 
back to square one. 
In summation, current military commissions and the MCA 
are not perfect, however, it is the most just system in place and it 
may not be practical to start anew; therefore, it is crucial to 
improve the MCA while continuing its use.  The sentencing 
guidelines provided by the MCA, which grant wide discretion to 
the commissions, is surely an area requiring improvement.  The 
goal of this Comment is to analyze the sentencing guidelines and 
rules to propose changes that should be made.14 
Part I of this Comment provides a brief history and 
description of military commissions and explains where the 
authority for commissions originated—particularly the United 
States Constitution,15 Supreme Court jurisprudence,16 and the 
Law of War.17  Part I further examines the significance of the 
 
 11 See, e.g., AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, FACT SHEET: MILITARY COMMISSIONS 
ACT, available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/legpriorities2007p2.pdf [hereinafter ACLU 
FACT SHEET]. 
 12 Section 3 of the Order deals with the closure of Guantanamo, while Section 7 halts 
the current military commissions.  Exec. Order No. 13492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 
2009). 
 13 See Daphne Eviatar, Why Closing Gitmo Isn’t Enough, WASH. INDEP., Nov. 14, 
2008, http://washingtonindependent.com/18503/why-closing-gitmo-isnt-enough (providing 
general objections to Guantanamo Bay) (last visited Mar. 13, 2008).  But see Kyndra 
Miller Rotunda, Don’t Close Gitmo, WASH. TIMES, June 23, 2008, at A24 (citing numerous 
reasons why keeping Guantanamo open is the best course of action for the United States). 
 14  Although the current state of the MCA and military commissions are in flux, the 
suggestions in this Comment are applicable to any decision that may be made regarding 
the commissions.  If the commissions are reinstated, or if a new type of court or system is 
established, this Comment serves as guidance for those commissions or systems as well.  
Further, as will be discussed below, military commissions have been established in almost 
every war in American history, thus, this Comment offers sentencing guidance for future 
commissions. 
 15 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 9, 10. 
 16 See generally Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 48 (1942) (allowing the President to 
convene and order trial by military commission); see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 
557, 634–35 (2006) (finding the military commissions authorized by the President 
unconstitutional, but inviting Congress to write rules governing military commissions). 
 17 The Law of War consists of two components: (1) treatises, conventions, and 
agreements between countries and (2) custom.  See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE REPORT ON 
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MCA and explains the reasons why the United States must 
continue to use military commissions. 
Part II looks in depth at the MCA, examining the strong 
congressional intent to provide fair trials to detainees while still 
preserving United States’ national security.18  Part II also 
explores the policy reasons behind the sentencing guidelines in 
the MCA, in particular why such wide degree of discretion was 
given to the commission with respect to sentencing.  Next, Part 
III describes the problems with the current sentencing guidelines 
in the MCA, focusing on the problems of (1) administrative credit 
and (2) excessive commission discretion in sentencing. 
Finally, Part IV proposes a solution to the ambiguities in the 
sentencing guidelines.  These changes, if adopted, will provide 
stability for military commissions, helping to legitimize their use.  
Further, the changes will ensure that each convicted terrorist is 
given a fair sentence that is in proportion to the crime 
committed, while preserving national security. 
I.  A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW AND THE IMPORTANCE OF MILITARY 
COMMISSIONS 
Before probing into any problems the MCA may or may not 
have, an overview of the military commissions, its evolution and 
significance is important to understand.  This Part will define 
and provide a brief history and the authority that created the 
commissions as well as the importance of the MCA and 
continuation of the military commissions. 
A. A Brief Background of Military Commissions 
Under the MCA, a military commission is a court operated 
by the military “to try alien unlawful enemy combatants engaged 
in hostilities against the United States for violations of the Law 
 
THE CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR, 31 I.L.M. 612, 615 (1992) (“The United 
States . . . are parties to numerous law of war treaties intended to minimize unnecessary 
suffering by combatants and noncombatants during war.”);; U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, 
DIRECTIVE NO. 2311.01E, LAW OF WAR PROGRAM, sec. 3.1. (May 9, 2006), available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/231101p.pdf (defining the law of war as 
“[t]hat part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities”). 
 18 See generally 152 Cong. Rec. S10354 (2006).  Military Commissions provide: 
“Judicial guarantees recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples for purposes of 
common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions; “Appropriate protection of national security 
interests; and Protection and safety for all personnel participating in the process, 
including the accused.”  U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, FACT SHEET: MILITARY COMMISSIONS 
(2007), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2007/OMC%20Fact%20Sheet% 
20Aug%2007.pdf [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, FACT SHEET]. 
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of War and other offenses.”19  Throughout history there have 
been thousands of combatants subject to rulings by military 
commissions.20  However, there is a strong likelihood that many 
of these combatants did not receive a fair trial because of a desire 
to quickly punish combatants for their alleged war crimes.21 
As countries became civilized, military courts evolved.  
Although not officially dubbed “military commissions,” the first 
military courts in the United States were established to try a spy 
immediately following the American Revolution, and then again 
in 1818 to try two British Indian traders for assisting Native 
Americans in the Seminole Wars.22  The actual term “military 
commission” was not coined until the Mexican-American War in 
1847.23  Over the next century and a half, military commissions 
developed rapidly and were utilized heavily in the Civil War and 
both World War I and World War II.24  In 2001, President Bush 
issued an executive order instituting military commissions to try 
those detained as enemy combatants during the War on Terror.25 
1.  Domestic and International Authority: The Constitution 
and Law of War and the Involvement with the 
Development of the Military Commission 
The Constitution gives Congress the power to create military 
commissions.  It states that Congress has the power to 
“constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court”26 and to 
 
 19 10 U.S.C. § 948b(a) (Supp. 2008).  Military commissions are used rather than 
civilian courts because, according to President Bush, “the rules for trying enemy 
combatants in a time of conflict must be different from those for trying common criminals 
or members of our own military.”  News Release, The White House, President George W. 
Bush, President Discusses Creation of Military Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists 
(Sept. 6, 2006), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/ 
2006/09/20060906-3.html. 
 20 WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 834 (2d ed., rev. & enl., 
William S. Hein & Co. 2000) (1920) (finding that during the Civil War and Reconstruction 
there were over 2000 combatants tried by military commission). 
 21 MAROUF HASIAN, JR., IN THE NAME OF NECESSITY: MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND THE 
LOSS OF AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 2 (2005) (claiming that because foreign military 
tribunals violate human rights, do not provide a fair and equal trial, and lack civilian 
oversight, our military commission system also will not be just). 
 22 WINTHROP, supra note 20, at 832.  For a brief description of the history and 
character of military commissions, including their use in previous wars, see John Yoo, An 
Imperial Judiciary at War: Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 83, 84–99 
(2006). 
 23 Id. (“Assassination, murder, poisoning, rape, or the attempt to commit either, 
malicious stabbing or maiming, malicious assault and battery, robbery, theft, 
. . . committed by Mexicans or other civilians in Mexico against individuals of the U.S. 
military forces . . . should be brought to trial before ‘military commissions.’”). 
 24 LEONARD CUTLER, THE RULE OF LAW AND THE LAW OF WAR: MILITARY 
COMMISSIONS AND ENEMY COMBATANTS POST 9/11 4, 7 (2005); Yoo, supra note 22, at 91. 
 25 Exec. Order No. 01-28904, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001). 
 26 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. 
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“define and punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations.”27  
Further, Congress has the power to “declare War,” and “raise and 
support Armies.”28  The Constitution explicitly gave Congress 
war powers and, as such, “[t]he commission is simply an 
instrumentality for the more efficient execution of the war 
powers vested in Congress and the power vested in the President 
as Commander-in-chief in war.”29 
Although Congress has the power to create military 
commissions, it must be mindful of international law.  The Law 
of War is the main governing principle that countries must follow 
during times of conflict.30  One of the main treatises included in 
the Law of War is the Third Geneva Convention, which was 
enacted in 1949 to regulate the treatment of prisoners of war.31  
The Law of War places restrictions on the way certain countries 
can act during times of war and the United States is bound by it 
when it establishes and uses military commissions.32 
2.  Judicial Authority: Key Supreme Court Decisions and 
their Consequences on the Evolution of Military 
Commissions 
A major reason for the evolution of military commissions has 
been the involvement of the United States Supreme Court.  
Arguably, the most important case was Ex parte Quirin, in which 
a military commission was used to try and convict eight German 
saboteurs during World War II.33  The United States Supreme 
Court held: 
By [the President’s] Order creating the present Commission he has 
undertaken to exercise the authority conferred upon him by Congress, 
and also such authority as the Constitution itself gives the 
Commander in Chief, to direct the performance of those functions 
which may constitutionally be performed by the military arm of the 
nation in time of war.34 
 
 27 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
 28 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11, 12. 
 29 WINTHROP, supra note 20, at 831. 
 30 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE REPORT ON THE CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR, 
supra note 17; U.S DEP’T. OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE NO. 2311.01E, supra note 17. 
 31 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
 32  See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 625 (2006). 
 33 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 21–23 (1942).  Ex parte Quirin involved facts similar 
to those surrounding September 11.  First, the saboteurs were not wearing uniforms and 
were thus unidentifiable as combatants.  Second, the attacks were planned in the United 
States.  Id. 
 34 Id. at 28. 
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The Court went on to say that there is a strong presumption that 
military commissions are constitutional, and there must be a 
contrary showing before they will be struck down.35 
Roughly sixty years later, military commissions are again at 
issue before the Court due to the War on Terror.36  In Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, the Court found the conditions and procedures used by 
President Bush’s military commissions were not valid because, 
among other things, they violated the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice.37  In his concurring opinion, Justice Breyer agreed, 
stating: 
[A]s presently structured, Hamdan’s military commission exceeds the 
bounds Congress has placed on the President’s authority in . . . the 
UCMJ.  Because Congress has prescribed these limits, Congress can 
change them, requiring a new analysis consistent with the 
Constitution and other governing laws.  At this time, however, we 
must apply the standards Congress has provided.38 
However, the Court seemingly invited Congress to rewrite the 
rules governing military commissions.39  Congress responded to 
Hamdan by enacting the MCA, which provides detailed 
procedures on the use of military commissions.40 
A strong history, the Constitution, and the Supreme Court 
all provide authority to establish and use military commissions.  
Currently, military commissions are being used to try detainees 
in Guantanamo Bay for war crimes.  To date, the Court has not 
ruled on the constitutionality of these military commissions.  The 
first trial by military commission since World War II came to a 
close in August 2008 when Salim Ahmed Hamdan was convicted 
of providing material support to terrorism.41  Because military 
commissions are finally available and ready to move forward, 
their use should continue. 
 
 35 Id. at 28.  For another Supreme Court case supporting the use of military 
commissions, see In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 7–8, 25 (1946) (holding that a military 
court has the jurisdiction to rule on a commander’s actions, and their ruling will be given 
great deference). 
 36 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), was one of the first cases before the 
Supreme Court regarding the War on Terror and the war in Iraq.  Although not 
exclusively dealing with military commissions, the court found that the Government must 
come up with some criteria in holding enemy combatants, and must give all enemy 
combatants a chance to be heard.  Id. at 509.  For another current case involving 
detainees and the War on Terror, see Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (allowing access 
to federal courts by detainees). 
 37 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 634–35 (2006). 
 38 Id. at 653 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 39 Id. 
 40 See generally 10 U.S.C. § 948b (Supp. 2008). 
 41 Markon & White, supra note 6. 
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B. The Importance of Continuing to use Military Commissions 
As outlined above, the President and Congress have the 
authority to establish military commissions in certain situations.  
This section discusses why the use of military commissions 
should continue in the context of the current War on Terror.  
President Obama recently stalled the use of military 
commissions until their procedures can be reviewed.42  Instead of 
military commissions, Obama is considering trying detainees in 
United States federal courts, or setting up a new national 
security court.43  This would be a devastating mistake for the 
United States and its reputation. 
First, although military commissions face some systemic 
problems,44 they currently provide the only mechanism by which 
to try suspected enemy combatants.  One criticism of the MCA is 
that it has taken a long time to develop.45  However, commissions 
are finally in a position to move forward.  Starting a new system 
will place the United States back to square one and delay the 
process even longer.46  The MCA and military commissions were 
finally moving, and detainees were getting their day in court.  
Scrapping the MCA and starting with some other new system 
that will undoubtedly face more delays will simply not promote 
justice.47 
Second, there is no other viable option to replace military 
commissions.  Moving to federal court would undoubtedly destroy 
the heightened national security protections imposed by MCA.48  
 
 42 See Exec. Order No. 13492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4899 (Jan. 22, 2009). 
 43 Id. 
 44 The American Civil Liberties Union website outlines several perceived problems 
with military commissions.  ACLU FACT SHEET, supra note 11.  However, many of the 
comments are overemphasized and were made prior to the application of the MCA.  Not 
all of the problems mentioned by the ACLU are apparent.  See Ruling on Motion to 
Suppress Statements Based on Coercive Interrogation Practices, United States v. 
Hamdan (July 20, 2008), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Ruling%20on% 
20Motion%20to%20Suppress%2029%20and%20D-044%20Ruling%201%20(2).pdf. 
 45 See Ruling on Motion to Dismiss—Speedy Trial, United States v. Hamdan (July 
20, 2008), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Ruling%20on%20Motion% 
20to%20Dismiss%20Speedy%20Trial%20D-046.pdf.  It appears that trials have not moved 
faster because of the difficulty of collecting evidence world-wide and all of the appeals at 
the federal level that slow the process of military commissions. 
 46 In response to the idea of President Obama creating a National Security Court, 
Ken Gude of the Guardian stated: “Any attempt to circumvent a judicial system designed 
to ensure a fair trial will be met with deserved scorn and would likely lead to additional 
delays as defendants challenge procedures designed specifically to relax evidentiary 
standards and restrict defence and public access to classified evidence.”  Ken Gude, 
Guantánamo's Days are Numbered, GUARDIAN (England), Nov. 11, 2008, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2008/nov/11/barack-obama-
guantanamo-bay. 
 47 See id. 
 48 See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, FACT SHEET, supra note 18.  But see Ann Woolner, 
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To protect national security, the MCA allows certain evidence to 
be considered at trial that would otherwise be excluded by a 
civilian criminal court.49  The use of the civilian federal court 
system will bar certain reliable evidence, and force the United 
States to turn over highly confidential national security 
information.50  Quite simply, for a just outcome with respect to 
detainees who have expressed their intent to destroy the United 
States,51 all reliable evidence must be admitted at trial.52  
Therefore, the use of the federal court system to try defendants 
seriously undermines national security—something that should 
be a primary goal when dealing with the most dangerous people 
in the world. 
Finally, scrapping the MCA may potentially send the wrong 
message to the international community.  Cutting losses should 
not be done unnecessarily; if the United States gives up on the 
MCA it would be prematurely giving up on a set of fixable 
problems.  A simple application of the MCA’s evidentiary rules to 
Hamdan demonstrates their effectiveness.53  Furthermore, it is 
 
Fixing Terror Laws No Harder Than Economy, SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 9, 
2008, http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/opinion/391308_woolneronline10.html.  Woolner 
suggests moving detainees to federal courts because a federal judge knows how to deal 
with coercive evidence and, even if a terrorist is released, it won’t matter because the 
government will monitor him. 
 49  See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, FACT SHEET, supra note 18. 
 50 Chris Selley argues, despite the occurrence of torture with respect to certain 
detainees in the past, placing them in American courts would be a mistake because they 
may not get convicted because of procedural rules—a risk that cannot be taken.  Chris 
Selley, Give Barack Obama a Chance to Fail on Guantanamo, NAT’L POST FULL 
COMMENT, Dec. 16, 2008, 
http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/fullcomment/archive/2008/12/16/chris-selley-
give-barack-obama-a-chance-to-fail-on-guantanamo.aspx; see also Yoo, supra note 22, at 
86–87 (explaining why military commissions should admit more evidence than a federal 
court). 
 51 Many detainees have been quoted as saying, “[i]f I'm let out of here, I will go 
immediately and start killing Americans again.”  Roundtable Press Interview with 
Condoleezza Rice, Sec. of State, in London, Eng. (Dec. 1, 2008). 
 52 This Comment does not advocate torture, however it may be defined.  However, 
the MCA allows for the admissibility of statements obtained through some degree of 
coercion in particular situations in order to protect national security.  See 10 U.S.C. § 
948r(c)–(d) (2008).  Many are opposed to this section of the MCA as some suggest it may 
promote torture and kangaroo courts.  See, e.g., Edward M. Gomez, Bush Signs Torture 
Bill; Americans Lose Essential Freedom, S.F. GATE, Oct. 17, 2006, http://www.sfgate.com/ 
cgi-bin/blogs/sfgate/detail?blogid=15archive/&entry_id=9952 (“By signing into law the 
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Bush has made it legal for the C.I.A. to continue 
operating torture facilities in undisclosed, foreign countries . . . .”).  However, the 
evidentiary exception may be necessary for a fair trial, and may also benefit the defense.  
See Ruling on Motion to Suppress Statements Based on Coercive Interrogation Practices, 
supra note 44, at 15–16.  In fact, the coercive measures Hamdan complained about were 
only used in response to his misbehavior and unwillingness to cooperate.  See id. at 15. 
 53 Some evidence obtained by coercion was allowed after looking at the totality of the 
circumstances and the interests of justice, while other evidence was excluded.  Ruling on 
Motion to Suppress Statements Based on Coercive Interrogation Practices, supra note 44, 
at 15. 
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hard to criticize the commissions as “Kangaroo Courts” in light of 
Hamdan’s minimal sentence.54 
That being said, changes must be made because commissions 
are far from perfect.  The rest of this Comment is devoted to 
addressing an area of change necessary to the MCA, namely the 
current sentencing rules and guidelines. 
II. POLICIES AND FAULTS BEHIND THE MCA AND ITS 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
On October 17, 2006, President Bush signed the MCA.55  By 
creating an extensive set of rules that govern military 
commissions, Congress tried to ensure that detainees will be 
given a fair trial.56  This Part examines the MCA and the goals it 
is meant to accomplish. 
A. The General Intent Behind the MCA 
The general intent of the MCA, as provided by Congress, is 
to grant enemy combatants with fair trials, but also to protect 
national security.57  Section 948b(f) of the MCA reads: “A military 
commission established under this chapter is a regularly 
constituted court, affording all the necessary ‘judicial guarantees 
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples’ for 
purposes of common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention.”58  By 
calling for fair judicial procedures, this section of the MCA shows 
the strong intent of Congress to hold fair trials for enemy 
combatants.59 
Congressional meetings show the intent to preserve national 
security and provide fair trials.  Senator McConnell was quoted 
as saying, “[the MCA] is vitally important because this bill 
protects our national security, it protects classified information, 
and it protects the rights of defendants.”60  Senator Graham, a 
military lawyer for twenty years, said on the congressional record 
 
 54 Will Dunham, U.S. Terror Tribunals: Fair Trial or Kangaroo Court, REUTERS, 
May 26, 2003. 
 55  Press Briefing, Dep't of Defense, New Military Commissions Rules (Jan. 18, 
2007), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid= 
3868. 
 56  Id. (“The act and the procedures contained in this manual will ensure that alien 
unlawful enemy combatants who are suspected of war crimes and other -- and certain 
other offenses are prosecuted before regularly constituted courts affording all the judicial 
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized people.”). 
 57 DEP'T OF DEFENSE, FACT SHEET, supra note 18; see generally 152 CONG. REC. 
S10354 (2006). 
 58 10 U.S.C. § 948b(f) (2008). 
 59 152 CONG. REC. S10354, (2006) (statement of Sen. McConnell). 
 60 Id. 
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about the MCA, “[m]y goal is to render justice to the terrorists, 
even though they will not render justice to us.”61 
If the intent behind the MCA is clearly to protect national 
security while preserving fundamental liberties, then it naturally 
follows that the goal in sentencing should be the same.  However, 
Congress has made sentencing under the MCA ambiguous. 
B. Intent behind the Sentencing Guidelines in the MCA: The 
Policy and Intent behind Allowing Judges Great Discretion 
When Sentencing Convicted Terrorists 
The MCA and Chapter X of the Manual for Military 
Commissions (hereinafter MMC) provide judges with fairly loose 
sentencing procedures and principles and, as such, judges have 
wide discretion in deciding how to sentence a convicted enemy 
combatant.62  In general, the MCA is in place to provide basic 
guidelines for sentencing,63 while the MMC deals with the 
specifics of sentencing procedures.64 
1.  Sentencing Guidelines and Safeguards: How the MCA 
and MMC Impose Safeguards to Prevent Abuse of 
Discretion 
As it appears, the MCA and MMC provide only minimal 
guidelines that commissions must follow when sentencing.  In 
addition to the minimal procedural requirements discussed 
below, the MMC generally allows commissions to sentence any 
way they deem fit after hearing aggravating and mitigating 
factors.65  Rule 1002 of the MMC reads: “Subject to the 
limitations in this manual . . . the sentence to be adjudged is a 
matter within the discretion of the military commission.”66  As it 
appears, so long as a commission stays within the bounds of the 
sentencing limits provided by 10 U.S.C. section 950v,67 then its 
sentence shall be considered legitimate. 
While there is much discretion given to the commission in 
sentencing, the MCA and MMC may provide procedural 
 
 61 Id. (statement of Sen. Graham). 
 62 U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS, pt. II, ch. X (2007), 
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/MANUAL%20FOR%20MILITARY% 
20COMMISSIONS%202007%20signed.pdf [hereinafter MMC]. 
 63 See 10 U.S.C. § 948d(d) (Supp. 2008) (“A military commission under this chapter 
may . . . adjudge any punishment not forbidden by this chapter, including the penalty of 
death when authorized under this chapter or the law of war.”); see also id. § 949m(a)–(c). 
 64 See MMC, supra note 62, at R. 1001, 1006–07, 1009–11. 
 65 Id. at R. 1002. 
 66 Id. (emphasis added). 
 67 10 U.S.C. § 950v (Supp. 2008) (providing a list of crimes punishable by military 
commissions, and the maximum punishment that may be given for each crime). 
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safeguards to combat an abuse of discretion.  First, a minimum of 
two-thirds of the commission’s members are to determine the 
convict’s sentence.68  This provision helps keep discretion in 
check by taking the power from one single judge and spreading it 
to an entire panel.  Another safeguard allows the “Convening 
Authority”69 of the commission to reduce any sentence that may 
have been handed down by the commission.70  Again, this is 
another way to check the discretion of a commission as it allows 
the reduction of an overly harsh sentence. 
Finally, once convicted, a defendant may appeal the sentence 
to the Court of Military Commission Review, then to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and finally 
to the Supreme Court of the United States.71  The appellate 
procedure afforded the detainees is another way to limit the 
amount of discretion  of a military commission.72 
In general, although some procedures with regard to 
sentencing are provided in the MCA and MMC, “[t]he broad 
mandatory maximums . . . stand as the only meaningful 
substantive restraints on the sentencing discretion of military 
commissions.”73  Thus, despite minimal safeguards to prevent 
abuse of discretion, commissions are generally free to sentence as 
they please. 
2.  Intent Behind Sentencing in the MCA 
The primary goal of sentencing in military commissions 
should be no different than the goal of the MCA; to enhance the 
protection of the United States while preserving fundamental 
notions of justice for the detainees.74  However, the lack of 
 
 68 Id. § 949m(a). 
 69 The Convening Authority is the one who decides to prosecute certain charges.  The 
Convening Authority also appoints the Chief Judge of the Military Commissions Trial 
Judiciary.  DEP'T OF DEFENSE, FACT SHEET, supra note 18. 
 70 10 U.S.C. § 950b(c)(2)(C) (Supp. 2008).  The MCA is similar to the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure in this respect.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 (“Upon the government's 
motion made within one year of sentencing, the court may reduce a sentence if the 
defendant, after sentencing, provided substantial assistance in investigating or 
prosecuting another person.”). 
 71 10 U.S.C. §§ 950c, 950f, 950g (2008); see also Press Briefing, Dep’t of Defense, 
supra note 55. 
 72 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allow for an appeal from the district 
court to the appellate court and then to the Supreme Court, while the rules in the MCA 
allow for three appeals and review by the convening authority.  Compare FED. R. APP. P. 3 
and SUP. CT. R. 10 with 10 U.S.C. §§ 950b, 950c, 950f, 950g (2008). 
 73 Note, Laser Beam or Blunderbuss?: Evaluating the Usefulness of Determinate 
Sentencing for Military Commissions and International Criminal Law, 120 HARV. L. REV. 
1848, 1855–56 (2007) [hereinafter Laser Beam or Blunderbuss?].  This note puts forth the 
notion that proportionality and crime control are other policies behind the sentencing 
discretion given to commissions.  See id. at 1862–64. 
 74 See DEP'T OF DEFENSE, FACT SHEET, supra note 18. 
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information provided by Congress makes it difficult for a 
commission to determine exactly what to aim towards when 
sentencing. 
On one hand, there is the theory that, because the MCA was 
created to protect national security and to put dangerous 
terrorists behind bars,— the main intent was to provide for harsh 
sentences.75  For example, a death sentence for a non-violent 
crime such as spying76 could promote national security through 
deterrence and incapacitation.77  However, while the death 
penalty is allowed under the MCA and MMC,78 and has 
traditionally been allowed within other military commissions,79 
the strict procedural requirements for enforcing the death 
penalty make it an unlikely sentence.80  An example of this was 
displayed in the recent case of Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al 
Bahlul, a high-level Al Qaeda operative that was convicted, but 
only sentenced to life in prison.81  If he was not given the death 
penalty under the current MCA, it is hard to imagine that any 
terrorist will be. 
If Congress had intended for the harshest sentence possible 
to be handed out after a conviction, it most certainly would have 
stated so.  Further, military commissions do not seem to be 
following the goal of promoting national security, as the only two 
cases decided did not grant the harshest sentence that could be 
imposed: (1) al Bahlul was not sentenced to death, but rather life 
in prison;82 and (2) Hamdan was sentenced to effectively five 
months in prison.83  In addition, a third case was settled before 
trial, and the detainee was released with almost no 
punishment.84 
On the other hand, Congress surely did not provide that a 
commission grant light sentences in order to preserve 
fundamental principles of justice.  While the non-use of the death 
penalty in recent cases may show intent to preserve fundamental 
principles of justice, Congress did in fact call for the death 
 
 75 See Laser Beam or Blunderbuss?, supra note 73, at 1862–63. 
 76 See 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(27) (2008). 
 77 See Laser Beam or Blunderbuss, supra note 73, at 1863. 
 78 MMC, supra note 62, at R. 1004. 
 79 CUTLER, supra note 24, at 15. 
 80 See MMC, supra note 62, at R. 1004. 
 81 Al Bahlul also contributed seriously to September 11.  Further, al Bahlul made 
propaganda and training videos for al Qaeda and even volunteered to be a September 
11th hijacker.  See Charge Sheet of al Bahlul, supra note 7.  Even after being convicted, al 
Bahlul was still not sentenced to death.  McFadden, supra note 4. 
 82 McFadden, supra note 4. 
 83 See Glaberson, supra note 4. 
 84  McFadden, supra note 4 (“A third prisoner, Australian David Hicks, reached a 
plea agreement that sent him home to serve a nine-month prison sentence.”). 
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penalty upon conviction of certain crimes.85  While the MCA 
provides safeguards to help avoid an abuse of discretion, these 
safeguards do not prevent the imposition of the harshest 
sentence possible.  The commission is to take into account all 
aggravating and mitigating factors and grant a just sentence.86  
As such, any given commission can grant a harsh or light 
sentence.  Thus, depending on the mood of a commission on any 
given day, a convicted may be sentenced to death if the crime 
calls for it. 
Further, Congress did not explicitly state what a commission 
should keep in mind when determining a sentence, and as such, 
Congress has granted wide discretion to commissions and 
provided them with little sentencing guidance.87  For example, 
the MMC through its sentencing guidelines advocates that the 
goal in sentencing is to punish the defendant in a way that trial 
counsel sees fit88—this shows the clear intent of Congress to 
allow the commission to punish as they please.  Whether it is to 
promote national security or to preserve fundamental rights of 
the convicted, a military commission’s sentence should conform 
to some type of standard.  The next section examines the 
practical problems created from ambiguous sentencing guidelines 
that provide a large amount of discretion to military 
commissions. 
III.  PRACTICAL PROBLEMS CREATED BY MCA SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES 
Once the MCA was applied at trial, problems surfaced that 
were not anticipated when the MCA was enacted, particularly in 
dealing with sentencing.  It appears that ambiguous sentencing 
requirements created some confusion in military commissions.  
Further, these problems are harder to remedy as the MCA has 
rarely been used.89  Thus, there is minimal precedent to follow. 
 
 85 See generally 10 U.S.C. § 950v (2008) (providing a list of all crimes that a detainee 
can be charged with and the possible sentences that may accompany a conviction). 
 86 See MMC, supra note 62, at R. 1001. 
 87 See Laser Beam or Blunderbuss?, supra note 73, at 1856 (“Because the 
commissions face hard limits only at the margins, these conditions can be described as 
‘bounded discretion.’”). 
 88 MMC, supra note 62, at R. 1001(g) (providing that trial counsel can argue various 
different punishment theories that should be applied). 
 89 See Glaberson, supra note 4. 
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A. Time Held Counts Towards Time Served: The Application of 
the MCA to Hamdan and the Unfortunate Confusion that 
Ensued 
While it is clear that Congress gave full authority to 
sentence convicted terrorists via military commissions,90 
Congress provided ambiguous guidelines and procedures for 
sentencing.91  Naturally, when the MCA was applied for the first 
time, problems surfaced.  One such problem was that of 
administrative credit.92  Administrative credit is the ruling of a 
court that grants pre-trial time held in prison toward the 
sentence given; it is a way of reducing a convict’s sentence.93  
Administrative credit is currently allowed under the Federal 
Criminal Justice system in certain situations.94  The question 
then becomes, should detainees brought to trial via military 
commissions be entitled to administrative credit?  The rules and 
procedures in the MCA do not provide an answer to that 
question. 
When Hamdan was sentenced to five and a half years in 
prison the commission granted administrative credit to count 
towards his sentence.95  Effectively, his sentence of five and a 
half years was reduced to roughly five months, and, in November 
2008, he was released to Yemen to serve out the rest of his 
sentence.96  Immediately following the sentence, the government 
filed a motion regarding the issue of administrative credit, 
requesting that the commission be reconvened, told of the error of 
 
 90 See 10 U.S.C. § 948b(a) (2008). 
 91  See supra notes 65, 87–88 and accompanying text. 
 92 See Corrected Government Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 5, at 1. 
 93 See Michael L. Kanabrocki, Revisiting United States v. Allen: Applying Civilian 
Pretrial Confinement Credit for Unrelated Offenses Against Court-Martial Sentences to 
Post-Trial Confinement Under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b)(2), 2008 ARMY LAW. 1, 1 (Aug. 2008). 
 94 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (2008) (“A defendant shall be given credit toward the service of 
a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date 
the sentence commences”).  Administrative credit in the federal system can be granted in 
two circumstances: “(1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; or 
(2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was arrested after the 
commission of the offense for which the sentence was imposed.” Id. 
 95 Markon & White, supra note 6.  The commission granted administrative credit 
claiming they had the authority to do so.  However, the government claims that nothing 
in the MCA or MMC allows for the granting of administrative authority.  Corrected 
Government Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 5, at 1.  Although the commission did 
not state where they drew the authority to grant administrative credit, it is possible that 
the commission believed they had authority to grant administrative credit via case 
precedent.  See United States v. Allen, 17 M.J. 126, 128 (C.M.A. 1984) (granting 
administrative credit).  The Court of Military Appeals in Allen was the first military court 
to grant administrative credit.  Kanabrocki, supra note 93, at 1. 
 96 Josh White & William Branigin, Hamdan To Be Sent To Yemen, WASH. POST, Nov. 
25, 2008, at A1. 
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administrative credit, and to issue a new sentence.97  The 
government contended that Hamdan was held pre-trial as an 
enemy combatant and as such he should not be granted 
administrative credit.98  Judge Allred and the military 
commission refused to reconsider the sentence without 
explanation.99  Thus, the issue of administrative credit was never 
decided. 
Failure to resolve the dispute over administrative credit 
creates several other problems.  First, the clash between 
prosecutor and commission is sure to arise again and, depending 
on the military commission, the result may be different—that is, 
administrative credit may not be granted.  Thus, the lack of 
standards will create inconsistent results, which will lead to 
instability for military commissions.100 
Second, Congress has not taken action to quell the confusion.  
Congress was granted the authority by the Supreme Court to 
write the MCA and rules that govern commissions.101  The idea of 
administrative credit may have been foreseeable to Congress, as 
there is a federal statute counterpart102 and previous military 
cases have granted administrative credit.103  Yet Congress did 
not explicitly state whether granting administrative should be 
allowed.  As stated above, both the prosecution and the 
commission have valid arguments for and against granting 
 
 97 Essentially the government argued that Hamdan was held as an enemy 
combatant pursuant to the Geneva Convention and as such his time held at Guantanamo 
is a separate issue from the sentence he was given for the crimes he committed.  
Corrected Government Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 5, at 1; Posting of Lyle 
Denniston to SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog. com/wp/?s=hamdan (Oct. 19, 2008, 
4:01 PM). 
 98 Corrected Government Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 5, at 1. 
 99 It appears that Commission Judge Allred read the briefs and did not provide a 
reason as to why the motion was refused.  See Ruling on Motion for Reconsideration and 
Sentencing, United States v. Hamdan, [full case citation] (court & year) (docket no.), 
available at, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/hamdan-
sentence-order-10-29-08.pdf; Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSBLOG, 
http://www.scotusblog. com/wp/?s=hamdan (Oct. 30, 2008, 3:14 PM). 
 100 Although dealing with a different set of military courts and problems, 
commissions that tried World War II criminals faced similar problems with inconsistent 
results.  Eventually, it was the inconsistencies that led to the undermining of the 
legitimacy of the commissions.  Durwood "Derry" Riedel, The U.S. War Crimes Tribunals 
at the Former Dachau Concentration Camp: Lessons for Today?, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 
554, 575 (2006). 
 101 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 653 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
part).  Although the Supreme Court found military commissions recently set up by the 
President Bush unconstitutional, it invited Congress to make a set of rules that govern 
military commissions; thus the MCA was enacted.  Regina Fitzpatrick, Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld: Implications for the Geneva Conventions, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 339, 347 
(2007). 
 102 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (2008). 
 103 United States v. Allen, 17 M.J. 126, 129–29 (C.M.A. 1984). 
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administrative credit to detainees but, until a rule is created, 
confusion will continue to ensue and resources will be wasted.  As 
a result, sentences will continue to lack legitimacy and validity. 
Finally, this dispute creates embarrassment for the United 
States nationally and aboard as the inter-branch conflict remains 
unresolved.  Clearly, the dispute over administrative credit must 
be solved.  However, it is not the only problem that exists with 
regard to sentencing.  The commissions currently have too much 
discretion in sentencing, as discussed in the next Section. 
B. Confusion and Uncertain Results: How Lack of a Guiding 
Principle led to Serious Problems with Regard to Sentencing 
While a lack of rules led to an obvious conflict between 
different branches of government, the amount of discretion given 
to a commission combined with minimal guiding principles 
created another set of problems that may not be readily 
apparent.  Uncertain and inconsistent sentences can lead to 
serious problems that undermine the validity of military 
commissions.104  A goal of most sentencing schemes is to provide 
just sentences.  For example, one goal of the United States 
Sentencing Commission105 is to “provide certainty and fairness in 
meeting the purposes of sentencing.”106  While a goal of military 
commissions may be to provide fairness in sentencing,107 there is 
no stated “purpose” of sentencing. 
The ability of the commission to sentence not based on a 
definitive standard will create confusion and uncertain results.  
One problem created by such discretion given to commissions is 
those attorneys, defendants, the prosecution, the government and 
even the public have little idea about how a convicted individual 
may be sentenced.  For example, when Hamdan was 
sentenced,108 the prosecution was disappointed;109 President 
 
 104 When Congress was creating new federal sentencing laws, one aim was to rid the 
system of inconsistent sentences.  Stanley A. Weigel, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: 
A Practical Appraisal, 36 UCLA L. REV. 83, 98 (1988) (“The legislators were concerned 
that disparities generated disrespect for the law . . . .”). 
 105 The United States Sentencing Commission is an independent agency that helps 
develop sentencing guidelines for federal courts, studies sentencing issues and proposes 
solutions.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING 
COMMISSION 1–2 (2005), available at http://www.ussc.gov/general/ 
USSCoverview_2005.pdf. 
 106 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2008) (emphasis added). 
 107 See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, FACT SHEET, supra note 18. 
 108 Glaberson, supra note 4. 
 109 While the prosecution sought thirty years, they were not too upset by the lighter 
sentence handed down to Hamdan as they were hopeful that the eighty other detainees to 
come to be tried would receive harsher sentences.  Alan Gomez, Bin Laden Driver Gets 5 
½-Year Sentence, USA TODAY, Aug. 7, 2008, at A1.  However, one prosecutor, John 
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Bush and the Pentagon were pleased;110  Hamdan was thrilled 
with the sentence;111 and the public was seemingly unsure as to 
the appropriate reaction toward the sentence he received.112  
However, a different commission might grant life in prison to a 
detainee convicted of the same charge as Hamdan.113  One 
consequence of this uncertainty is that it will be harder for both 
sides to plea bargain as neither side will be able to gauge the 
strength of their case.114  This uncertainty further creates chaotic 
and disorganized results with no real pattern, which reduces the 
legitimacy of the MCA. 
Inconsistent results come about when each commission is 
allowed to sentence as they please.  For Example, Ali Hamza 
Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul was charged and convicted of 
conspiracy and sentenced to life in prison.115  According to the 
MMC and MCA, al Bahlul could have been sentenced to death,116 
but the commission decided against it.  Currently, in a joint trial, 
five co-conspirators involved in the September 11 attacks117 are 
likely to be convicted and sentenced for the same crimes that al 
Bahlul committed.  However, there is nothing in the MCA or 
MMC to stop this commission from sentencing the co-
conspirators to death instead of life in prison.  Clearly every case 
is different; each has its own set of facts and, as such, each 
 
Murphy, was quoted as saying: “Your sentence should say the United States will hunt you 
down and give you a harsh but appropriate sentence if you provide material support for 
terrorism.”  Glaberson, supra note 4. 
 110 The White House and the Pentagon seemed pleased with the sentence as it 
demonstrated the fairness of the commissions when Hamdan was given a seemingly mild 
sentence.  Jamie McIntyre, Bin Laden's Former Driver Guilty in Terror Trial, CNN.com, 
Aug. 6, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/08/06/hamdan.trial/index.html. 
 111 Hamdan appeared apologetic and looked forward to his release.  Markon & White, 
supra note 6. 
 112 See Glaberson, supra note 4; McIntyre, supra note 110. 
 113 See 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(25) (Supp. 2008) (providing that one who gives material 
support or resources for terrorism “may be punished as a military commission under this 
chapter may direct.”). 
 114 An inability to plea bargain can lead to a waste of resources because many more 
cases are likely to go to trial.  Further, military commissions may become flooded with 
detainees as trials in general will take longer.  Steven E. Walburn, Should the Military 
Adopt an Alford-Type Guilty Plea?, 44 A.F. L. REV. 119, 120–22 (1998). 
 115 McFadden, supra note 4.  Al Bahlul was given a life sentence, so the defect in 
administrative credit was not present.  See id. 
 116 See 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(28) (Supp. 2008) (“Any person subject to this chapter who 
conspires to commit one or more substantive offenses triable by military commission 
under this chapter, and who knowingly does any overt act to effect the object of the 
conspiracy, shall be punished, if death results to one or more of the victims, by death”); see 
also MMC, supra note 62, at IV-21 to 22. 
 117 Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Walid Muhammad Salih Mubarek bin 'Attash, Ramzi 
Binalshibh, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, and Mustafa Ahmed Adam al Hawsawi, are all being 
charged with conspiracy for their acts leading up to and on September 11.  See generally 
September 11 Co-Conspirators Charge Sheets, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/ 
news/commissionsCo-conspirators.html (follow “Referred Charges” hyperlinks). 
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sentence should reflect those differences.  However, the case of al 
Bahlul is factually similar to that of the five co-conspirators of 
September 11.  A sentence of death for the five co-conspirators 
would be an inconsistent result, creating instability in military 
commissions. 
Although there may be some advantages to allowing such 
discretion,118 ensuring that military commissions are legitimate 
should be the ultimate goal.  The uncertainty and inconsistent 
outcomes that may result will lead to a perception that 
undermines the validity of the courts.  The final section of this 
Comment examines possible solutions to the problems outlined 
above. 
IV.  TWO RULES TO IMPROVE THE VALIDITY OF MILITARY 
COMMISSIONS 
The overall goal of Congress should be to improve the 
legitimacy of the MCA and military commissions such that, as 
they continue to go forward, the United States remains protected, 
while at the same time detainees are given fair trials.  Incident to 
this goal is the improvement of the sentencing guidelines in the 
MCA. 
A. Fixing the Immediate Problem: Administrative Credit 
Should be Allowed 
Congress should expressly authorize military commissions to 
grant administrative credit under certain circumstances.  In 
other words, a convict might be entitled to deduct time already 
served if a commission deems it appropriate.  In order to preserve 
the goals behind the MCA—preserving national security while 
protecting a right to a fair trial—administrative credit must be 
granted in certain situations. 
First, as discussed above, military commissions currently 
have the authority to grant administrative credit.  According to 
common law and precedent, the military has authority to grant 
administrative credit.119  Further, administrative credit may be 
granted in federal criminal cases in certain situations under 18 
U.S.C. section 3585(b).120  While there is also authority to support 
 
 118  See Laser Beam or Blunderbuss?, supra note 73, at 1864 (“A high tolerance for 
variability in sentencing may help the commissions respond to the shifting demands of 
the war on terrorism.”). 
 119 See United States v. Allen, 17 M.J. 126, 129 (C.M.A. 1984). 
 120 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (2008). 
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denying administrative credit,121 the practical effects of allowing 
for such credit should persuade Congress to do so. 
A rule allowing for administrative credit will only apply to a 
small number of cases.  Obviously, administrative credit will not 
apply in all cases, as detainees such as al Bahlul, who have 
committed the most egregious acts, will undoubtedly serve life in 
prison.122  Also, despite the ability to grant administrative credit, 
it must not be an absolute guarantee and only limited to certain 
situations.123  Because of the small number of cases to which 
administrative credit may be limited, the release of potentially 
dangerous terrorists following a reduced sentence becomes less 
likely and, as such, national security will still be preserved. 
Every person tried by a military commission will likely have 
been detained pre-trial.  A law allowing for administrative credit 
protects the fundamental rights of detainees by acting as a 
safeguard against unlawful pre-trial detainment.  Allowing the 
application of administrative credit would act as one way124 to 
release detainees who may not have committed serious crimes 
but have been held for a long time.  Hamdan was likely granted 
administrative credit because the commission deemed he had 
already served his sentence.125  The ability to grant 
administrative credit allows a commission to look at the facts of a 
particular case—why and how long a detainee has been held—
and allows for application of a just sentence.  As such, a rule 
allowing for administrative credit also promotes justice. 
The main objection to administrative credit is that pre-trial 
detention is independent of the crime committed and resulting 
sentence and thus should not count toward the sentence.126  
 
 121 The government contends that the Geneva Convention allows for the detainment 
of enemy combatants until the current conflict is over and, thus, the detainees are held 
independent of the charges against them and should be forced to serve the full sentence 
given to them.  See Corrected Government Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 5, at 
3‒ 5. 
 122 See McFadden, supra note 4. 
 123 For example, 18 U.S.C. section 3585(b) (2008) allows administrative credit only 
where a detainee is held “(1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was 
imposed; or (2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was arrested after 
the commission of the offense for which the sentence was imposed.” 
 124 Another way enemy combatants can challenge their detainment is through habeas 
corpus review.  Boumediene v. Bush, No. 06-1195, slip op. at 1–2 (U.S. June 12, 2008). 
 125 Although the commission did not state the reasons why it granted administrative 
credit, it clearly believed Hamdan had been detained for too long.  See Corrected 
Government Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 5, at 1. 
 126 The prosecution’s argument is that the detainees were held as enemy combatants 
and their detainment had nothing to do with the crimes for which they were ultimately 
charged.  Id. at 6.  See also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (“The United 
States may detain, for the duration of these hostilities, individuals legitimately 
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Traditionally, in order to be eligible for administrative credit, a 
person must have been detained in connection with their crime or 
any other charge they were arrested for after their original 
crime.127  Clearly, it can also be argued that the reason these 
detainees are held is because they committed the crimes for 
which they are ultimately charged.  As such, they were detained 
in connection with their crime and thus should be granted 
administrative credit. 
Because there is authority to grant administrative credit, 
and the practical effects of allowing administrative credit are 
crucial in providing stability for military commissions, a law 
permitting administrative credit in certain situations, when the 
commission deems it necessary, must be enacted.  The next 
section discusses a possible solution to the problems caused by 
providing commissions with wide discretion without any clear 
sentencing guidelines. 
B. Fixing the Guidelines: Commissions Should Implement the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
The main problem with the large amount of discretion given 
to commissions is the uncertainty and inconsistency of the 
results that have developed.  If the goal of military commissions 
is to ensure fair trials while preserving national security, the 
current arbitrary sentencing procedures will not satisfy either 
objective.  The easiest and most effective change would be to 
model the commission sentencing guidelines after the federal 
sentencing guidelines.128  A sentencing scheme modeled after the 
Federal Rules of Sentencing would be effortless to create, and 
 
determined to be Taliban combatants who ‘engaged in an armed conflict against the 
United States.’”) 
 127 See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (2008).  For an analysis of different types of sentencing 
credit with respect to the military, see Michael G. Seidel, Giving Service Members the 
Credit They Deserve: A Review of Sentencing Credit and Its Application, 1999 ARMY LAW. 
1 (1999). 
 128 The federal sentencing guidelines are generally governed by the Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984, part of which is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2008).  Pub. L. No, 98-
473, 98 Stat. 1987, 2017 (1984).  These guidelines were passed in response to many of the 
same problems in federal court that current military commissions are facing—
inconsistent results and arbitrary sentencing.  Weigel, supra note 104, at 98.  Two 
reasons the federal sentencing guidelines were established were to “incorporate the 
purposes of sentencing (i.e., just punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation),” and to “provide certainty and fairness by . . . avoiding unwarranted 
disparity among offenders with similar characteristics convicted of similar criminal 
conduct.”  U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 105, at 1.  Another goal of the sentencing 
guidelines was to “increase the certainty and severity of punishment by eliminating 
parole and increasing sentencing severity for some crimes.”  See U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM'N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM 38 
(2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/15_year/15_year_study_full.pdf. 
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could be implemented relatively quickly without additional 
delays for detainees who are awaiting trial. 
Application of the federal sentencing guidelines will surely 
provide stability and thus improve the legitimacy of the MCA.  
Essentially, the federal guidelines provide judges with 
sentencing ranges that account for the seriousness of the crime 
and the defendant’s past criminal record.129  Generally, the 
guidelines provide for sentences that may be consistently 
applied, and were created to remedy the exact problem that 
military commissions are having—inconsistent and arbitrary 
outcomes that result from too much discretion.130  The use of the 
same guidelines in every military commission removes the threat 
of a panel of military members sentencing a “low level terrorist” 
such as Hamdan to death, and forces each commission to abide 
by the sentencing rules.  At the same time, some judicial 
discretion is preserved as the commissions will look at the 
detailed facts of every case and determine which sentence to 
apply much like federal judges do.131 
By following the federal sentencing guidelines, fairness and 
protection of detainees’ rights will be preserved.  First, the 
federal guidelines are part of a proven system that has been in 
place for decades.132  The use of this established system will quiet 
doubters who believe that commissions are “Kangaroo Courts.”133  
Further, the use of the guidelines allows Congress to determine 
the appropriate sentence for a particular crime, rather than 
allow a military commission to do so on a case-by-case basis.  If a 
convict falls within a sentencing range that is indeed too harsh 
for one reason or another, the United States Supreme Court has 
found that “while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must 
consult those Guidelines and take them into account when 
sentencing.”134  As such, a commission can still ensure that a 
convict is given the sentence he deserves. 
One objection to the use of the guidelines is that sentencing 
flexibility will be removed and, essentially, Congress will be 
making the sentencing decision.135  However, if the military 
 
 129 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 105, at 2.  The sentencing range is 
determined by the point on the sentencing table where the criminal record and the 
seriousness of the crime intersect.  Id. 
 130 Id. at 1–2. 
 131 Weigel, supra note 104, at 101. 
 132  U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 105, at 1–2. 
 133 See Dunham, supra note 54. 
 134 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005). 
 135 See Weigel, supra note 104, at 105 (“It is far better to have an independent judge 
determine the appropriate sentence in any given case . . . than to turn that problem over 
to a body which, in the end, acts as a Washington-headquartered restraint upon 
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commissions are going to succeed, they need a stable foundation 
to ensure their legitimacy.  The use of these guidelines by 
military commissions will institute a proven system that provides 
consistency.  And while one goal of the guidelines is to impose 
harsher sentences,136 the use of the federal guidelines coupled 
with the allowance of administrative credit will ensure that a 
convicted detainee is given a fair and just sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
Even today, after roughly 233 years, new rules are routinely 
created for United States criminal courts.  Courts simply cannot 
be created with one act from Congress; they need time to grow 
and develop.  While Congress tried to foresee many problems 
regarding the MCA and military commissions, they were not able 
to eliminate every problem.  And even though problems appeared 
in the MCA after Hamdan, current military commissions must 
continue to be used as they are the most practical system in 
place.  Military Commissions must continue to improve their 
validity, they must continue to grow.  Changes regarding 
sentencing must be made in order to improve the legitimacy of 
military commissions. 
A system resembling the Federal Guidelines will provide 
certain and non-arbitrary results.  While some believe that the 
guidelines will provide overly harsh sentences, allowing 
administrative credit may effectively reduce sentences while 
preserving some discretion for the commissions.  As such, each 
detainee will receive the sentence he deserves and the United 
States will remain protected. 
 
judgments best determined locally and individually.”). 
 136 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 128, at 38. 
